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From Path Traversal to Persistence in Power Automate Desktop

Where there's unzip, there's zip slip.

This article has been approved by Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) for publication. The content on this blog is published for educational and informational purposes only.

Before we dive into the topic, I would like to first explain what Power Automate Desktop is and what it does in general. This will provide context and help you understand the finding and my methodology. Because a good researcher understands the system first then exploit!

What is Power Automate Desktop?

I won’t reinterpret the program’s definition, so here is the definition provided by Microsoft.

Desktop flows broaden the existing robotic process automation (RPA) capabilities in Power Automate and enable you to automate all repetitive desktop processes. Automating is quicker and easier than ever with the new intuitive Power Automate desktop flow designer using the prebuilt drag-and-drop actions or recording your own desktop flows to run later.

In short, it’s a process automation orchestration tool. You can use it to automate repetitive daily tasks. Basically, it enhances efficiency through automation. Power Automate Desktop is a part of Microsoft Power Platform (Power BI, Power Apps, Copilot Studio, etc). It's also heavily integrated to work well with SharePoint and other Microsoft services.

Installation

To install Power Automate Desktop (PAD), it's pretty straightforward. If you have Windows license key, you can download the program from Microsoft Store.

Reconnaissance

Actually, each person has their own approach to hunting vulnerabilities. This is not a one-size-fits-all methodology, but rather my personal way of approaching any target.

When it comes to gray-box scope, I first set a goal for which vulnerability category to focus on. Then, I use multiple tools, including AI, to identify applications with features that may be vulnerable. From there, I narrow down the list and double down on those targets until I’m confident the application is worth investigating further. (This is my methodology when I need a quick result.)

I also avoid hunting on the web application surface, as it is swarmed by automated scanning and many researchers. It’s better to compete on signal rather than noise. 😖😖😖

In this case, I was looking for path traversal vulnerability and I was exploring PAD features that I could interact with via the UI. After some time, I identified a target function that I set my sights on.

In PAD, there is a feature called “Flow.” A flow is used to set up process automation workflows using the provided options (actions) for customization.

Vulnerability detail

In 2018, a cybersecurity research team named Snyk discovered the Zip Slip vulnerability or Path Traversal in which affected by many archive compression programs such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, etc.

The vulnerability allows an attacker to craft a malicious archive file in which the files inside contain path traversal payloads as their filenames. During decompression, the program interprets these payloads as destination paths for extraction, leading to file misplacement.

Even worse, if a user with high privileges extracts the archive, an attacker could overwrite files in privileged directories, potentially causing a denial of service. Additionally, on some operating systems such as Windows, an attacker could abuse this to place a malicious program in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. When the victim boots Windows and logs in again, the malicious program would be executed.

Vulnerable Java source code example from Snyk

As shown in the above code snippet, This method enumerates files inside an archive file to create a new file in destination path by directly concatenating destination directory path (C:\something\destination\) and(+) filename(file.exe). The attack vector is like this. An attacker can rename a filename to something like ../../../../../../file.exe in attempt to change extraction path. When this method is being called (usually during archive file extraction), it would drop the file in a different extraction path and that is a path traversal vulnerability.

The fix is easy. In Java, you can use builtin Java method called getCanonicalPath() to normalize the filename path. The method will change the filename path (../../../../../../file.exe) to the absolute path. For example, Windows ⇒ \file.exe and Linux ⇒ /file.exe (I know by default you can't run .exe in Linux). To ensure that the path won't traverse, the function must check that the extraction path starts with destinationDir argument value.

{% hint style="info" icon="circle-question" %} Do you think it is necessary to use getCanonicalPath() method for destinationDir even though it is not an attacker-controlled input? If you audit the codebase and found pattern like this, would you raise it as a finding? 😆

For more details: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/23.html

Proof of Concept

The POC is intended for practical demonstration. I will not provide any payload.

I will explain the PoC in a narrative way rather than step by step to help you understand my thought process. (The PoC video is provided below—if you prefer, feel free to scroll down and watch it.)

  1. Initially, I decompiled the PAD program to track down the responsible function and method for the "Unzip" action and identified Zip Slip vulnerability. (PAD is a closed-source software. I'm afraid I shouldn't reveal any source code here.)

Unzip action is used to vulnerable to Zip Slip vulnerability
  1. By default, PAD processes are running as the current user privilege. So the impact such as arbitrary file write via privileged folders is not possible. Thus, the impact radius is small.

  2. At this point, I realized that even though I could exploit the vulnerability, the impact did not cross a security boundary. In Windows, it is normal for a user to extract files into their own directories. This is very important when reporting to vendors like Microsoft. You need to clearly demonstrate impact that aligns with their assessment criteria. These are the types of impact Microsoft is interested in.

Note: This doesn't mean XSS is not eligible. What they mean is the vulnerability impact not the category itself. (Fun fact: XSS is client-side RCE. 🤣). In fact, XSS findings tend to be cash-able than other vulnerability categories.

So far, my initial attack vector looks like this. As you can see, the attack possibility is unlikely happen. Thus, I need to find a way to make my exploitation aligns with Microsoft criteria bar.

  1. I decided to focus on a “remote” attack vector instead. I created a flow that downloads a ZIP file from an external host, which is then processed by the unzip action. My intention was to mimic how we pull a new version of a tool from a repository website and extract it for additional configuration.

mimic how we pull a new version of a tool from a repository website
  1. After identifying a better scenario, I needed to consider how to maximize the impact without crossing a privilege boundary. After giving some thought, I came up with the idea of dropping a file into the Startup folder (\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup) to achieve persistence, resulting in the impact is code execution.

  1. Voilà! That's it!

This is the POC video to help you understand the exploitation better.

Responsible disclosure timeline

I reported this issue to Microsoft via MSRC Researcher Portal.

1

2nd Mar 2026, 22:16

Submitted a report to MSRC.

2

3rd Mar 2026, 21:35

1st triage process: a report passed the first assessment. Case number assigned.

3

14th Mar 2026, 13:40

2nd triage process: a vulnerability severity does not meet criteria bar for bounty award.

4

16th Mar 2026, 13:21

Requested for the security researcher acknowledgment.

5

19th Mar 2026, 04:58

MSRC granted the security researcher acknowledgment.

6

25th Apr 2026, 07:31

MSRC fixed the issue and informed the researcher regarding to the security researcher acknowledgment.

7

30th April 2026

A security researcher name is display in Microsoft Service Online

Mitigation

To address this issue, Microsoft released a patch in version 11.2604.143.0 (Microsoft Store version) and 2.67.143.26090 (Installer version). In addition, the Power Automate Desktop team updated the documentation related to the Unzip action.

You would receive this error message when attempting to exploit Zip Slip vulnerability like this.

Later, Microsoft sent me two private opportunities to connect with the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) at Black Hat USA 2026 in Las Vegas.

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